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Abstract
Computing Nash equilibrium (NE) of multi-
player games has witnessed renewed interest due
to recent advances in generative adversarial net-
works. However, computing equilibrium effi-
ciently is challenging. To this end, we introduce
the Gradient-based Nikaido-Isoda (GNI) func-
tion which serves: (i) as a merit function, van-
ishing only at the first-order stationary points of
each player’s optimization problem, and (ii) pro-
vides error bounds to a stationary Nash point.
Gradient descent is shown to converge sublin-
early to a first-order stationary point of the GNI
function. For the particular case of bilinear min-
max games and multi-player quadratic games the
GNI function is convex. Hence, the application
of gradient descent in this case yields linear con-
vergence to an NE (when one exists). In our nu-
merical experiments we observe that the GNI for-
mulation always converges to the first-order sta-
tionary point of each player’s optimization prob-
lem.
1. Introduction
In this work, we consider the generalN -player game:
Find x∗ = (x⋆1, . . . , x
⋆
N ) s.t.
x⋆i = arg min
x∈Rn:x−i=x∗
−i
fi(x)
(1)
where xi ∈ R
ni , n =
∑N
i=1 ni, fi : R
n → R, x =
(x1, . . . , xN ) ∈ R
n denotes the collection of all xj’s, while
x−i denotes the collection of all xj’s except for index i, i.e.
x−i = (x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xN ) ∈ R
(n−ni). Observe
that the choice of x−i are specified when performing the
minimization in (1) for player i.
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A point x⋆ satisfying (1) is called a Nash Equilibrium (NE).
We denote by SNE the set of all NE points, i.e., SNE =
{x⋆ | (1) holds}. In the absence of convexity for the func-
tions fi we may not be able to obtain a minimizer in (1) and
have to settle for a first-order stationary point. Accordingly,
define SSNP to be the set of all Stationary Nash Points,
i.e., SSNP = {x⋆ | ∇ifi(x
⋆) = 0; ∀ i = 1, . . . , N} where
∇if denotes the derivative of function f w.r.t. xi.
There has been renewed interest in Nash equilibrium
computation for games owing to the success of Gen-
erative Adversarial Networks (GANs) (Goodfellow et al.,
2014). GANs have been successful in learning proba-
bility distributions and have found application in tasks
including image-to-image translation (Isola et al., 2016),
domain adaptation (Tzeng et al., 2017), probabilistic in-
ference (Dumoulin et al., 2016; Mescheder et al., 2017)
among others. Despite their popularity, GANs are known
to be difficult to train. In order to stabilize training
recent approaches have resorted to carefully designed
models, either by adapting an architecture (Radford et al.,
2015) or by selecting an easy-to-optimize objective
function (Salimans et al., 2016; Arjovsky et al., 2017;
Gulrajani et al., 2017).
The Nikaido-Isoda (NI) function (Nikaido & Isoda,
1955) (formally introduced in §3) is popular in equi-
librium computation (Uryasev & Rubinstein, 1994;
Contreras et al., 2004; Facchinei & Kanzow, 2007;
von Heusinger & Kanzow, 2009a;b) and often used as a
merit function for NE. The evaluation of the NI function
requires optimizing each player’s problem globally which
can be intractable for non-convex objectives.
In this paper, we introduce Gradient-based Nikaido-Isoda
(GNI) function which allows us to computationally sim-
plify the original NI formulation. Instead of computing a
globally optimal solution, every player can locally improve
their objectives using the steepest descent direction. The
proposed GNI function simplifies the original NI formula-
tion by relaxing the requirement on optimizing individual
player’s objective globally. We prove that GNI is a valid
merit function for multi-player games and vanishes only at
the first-order stationary points of each player’s optimiza-
tion problem (§3). The GNI function is shown to be lo-
cally stable in a neighborhood of a stationary Nash point
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(§3.1) and convex when the player’s objective function is
quadratic (§3.2). The gradient descent algorithm applied to
the GNI function converges to a stationary Nash point (§4).
In addition, if each of the player’s objective is convex in the
player’s variables (xi) then the algorithm converges to the
NE point as long as one exists (§4). A secant approxima-
tion is provided to simplify the computation of the gradient
of the GNI function and the convergence of the modified al-
gorithm is also analyzed (§5). Numerical experiments in §6
show that the proposed algorithm is effective in converging
to stationary Nash points of the games.
We believe our proposed GNI formulation could be an ef-
fective approach for training GANs. However, we empha-
size that the focus of this paper is to provide a rigorous
analysis of the GNI formulation for games and explore its
properties in a non-stochastic setting. The adaptation of
our proposed formulations to a stochastic setting (which is
the typical framework commonly used in GANs) will need
additional results, which will be explored in a future paper.
2. Related Work
Nash Equilibrium (NE) computation, a key area in al-
gorithmic game theory, has seen a number of devel-
opments since the pioneering work of John von Neu-
mann (Basar & Olsder, 1999). It is well known that the
Nash equilibrium problem can be reformulated as a vari-
ational inequality problem, VIP for short, see, for exam-
ple, (Facchinei & Pang, 2003a). The VIP is a generaliza-
tion of the first-order optimality condition in SSNP to the
case where the decision variables of player i’s xi are con-
strained to be in a convex set. Facchinei & Kanzow (2010)
proposed penalty methods for the solution of generalized
Nash equilibrium problems (Nash equilibrium problems
with joint constraints). Iusem et al. (2017) provides a de-
tailed analysis of the extragradient algorithm for stochastic
pseudomonotone variational inequalities (corresponding to
games with pseudoconvex costs).
Nash Equilibrium computation has found renewed inter-
est due to the emergence of Generative Adversarial Net-
works (GANs). It has been observed that the alternating
stochastic gradient descent (SGD) is oscillatory when train-
ing GANs (Goodfellow, 2016). Several papers proposed
to modify the GAN formulation in order to stabilize the
convergence of the iterates. These include non-saturating
GAN formulation of (Goodfellow et al., 2014; Fedus et al.,
2018), the DCGAN formulation (Radford et al., 2015), the
gradient penalty formulation for WGANs (Gulrajani et al.,
2017). The authors in (Yadav et al., 2017) proposed
a momentum based step on the generator in the alter-
nating SGD for convex-concave saddle point problems.
Daskalakis et al. (Daskalakis et al., 2018) proposed the op-
timistic mirror descent (OMD) algorithm, and showed con-
vergence for bilinear games and divergence of the gradi-
ent descent iterates. In a subsequent work, Daskalakis
et al. (Daskalakis & Panageas, 2018) analyzed the limit
points of gradient descent and OMD, and showed that the
limit points of OMD is a superset of alternating gradient
descent. Mertikopoulos et al. (2019) generalized and ex-
tended the work of Daskalakis et al. (2018) for bilinear
games. Li et al. (2017) dualize the GAN objective to refor-
mulate it as a maximization problem and Mescheder et al.
(2017) add the norm of the gradient in the objective. The
norm of the gradient is shown to locally stabilize the
gradient descent iterations in Nagarajan & Kolter (2017).
Gidel et al. (2018) formulate the GAN equilibrium as a VIP
and propose an extrapolation technique to prevent oscilla-
tions. The authors show convergence of stochastic algo-
rithm under the assumption of monotonicity of VIP, which
is stronger than the convex-concave assumption in min-
max games. Finally, the convergence of stochastic gradi-
ent descent in non-convex games has also been studied in
Bervoets et al. (2018); Mertikopoulos & Zhou (2019).
In contrast to existing approaches, the GNI approach does
not assume monotonicity in the game formulations. The
GNI approach is also closely related to the idea of minimiz-
ing residuals (Facchinei & Pang, 2003a;b).
3. Gradient-based Nikaido-Isoda Function
The Nikaido-Isoda (NI) function introduced
in (Nikaido & Isoda, 1955) is defined as
ψ(x) =
N∑
i=1
(
fi(x)− inf
xˆ∈Rn:xˆ−i=x−i
fi(xˆ)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:ψi(x)
.
From the definition of NI function ψ(x), it is easy to show
that ψ(x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ Rn. Further, ψ(x) = 0
is the global minimum which is only achieved if the NE
point x⋆ = (x∗1, . . . , x
⋆
N ) occurs at points where x
∗
i are
global minimizers of the respective optimization problems
in (1). A number of papers (Uryasev & Rubinstein, 1994;
von Heusinger & Kanzow, 2009a;b) have proposed algo-
rithms that minimize ψ(x) to compute NE points. How-
ever, the infimum needed to compute ψi(x) can be pro-
hibitive for all but a handful of functions. For bilinear min-
max games (i.e., f1(x) = x
T
1 x2 = −f2(x)), the infimum
is unbounded below and the approach of minimizing NI
fails. To rectify this recent papers have proposed regular-
ized variants (von Heusinger & Kanzow, 2009b). However,
the cost of globally minimizing the nonlinear function can
still be prohibitive.
To rectify the shortcoming of the NI function, we introduce
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the Gradient-based Nikaido-Isoda (GNI) function
V (x; η) =
N∑
i=1
fi(x)− fi(y(x; i, η))︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:Vi(x;η)
(2)
where yj(x; i, η) =
{
xi − η∇ifi(x), if j = i
xj , otherwise.
where∇if(x) denotes the derivative of function f w.r.t. xi.
The GNI function is obtained by replacing the infimum in
the NI function for player i with a point y(x; i, η) in the
steepest descent direction. This provides a local measure of
decrease that can be obtained in the objective for player i.
The point y(x; i, η) is similar in spirit to the Cauchy point
that is used in trust-region methods (Nocedal & Wright,
2006). We will show that any point satisfying Vi(x; η) = 0
also satisfies ∇ifi(x) = 0. To show this, we first provide
bounds on Vi(x; η) in terms of the distance from first-order
optimality conditions for each of the players.
We make the following standing assumption.
Assumption 1. The functions fi are at least twice continu-
ously differentiable and gradients of fi (i.e.,∇fi) are Lips-
chitz continuous with constant Lf .
Lemma 1. η2‖∇ifi(x)‖
2 ≤ Vi(x; η) ≤
3η
2 ‖∇ifi(x)‖
2
for all x ∈ Rn and 0 < η ≤ 1
Lf
.
Proof. Using the Taylor’s series expansion of fi around x
and substituting for y(x; i, η), we obtain
fi(y(x; i, η)) = fi(x)− η‖∇ifi(x)‖
2
+ η2
1∫
0
∇ifi(x)
T∇2i fi(xˆ(t))∇ifi(x)tdt
where xˆi(t) = xi − tη∇ifi(x) and xˆj(t) = xj , for j 6= i.
From the Lipschitz continuity of the gradient of fi, we have
that−LfIi  ∇
2
i fi(xˆ(t))  LfIi, where Ii is the (ni×ni)
identity matrix. Substituting in the above and using η ≤ 1
Lf
yields the claim.
We now state our main result relating the zeros of Vi(x; η)
and the first-order critical points of the players’s optimiza-
tion problems.
Theorem 1. The global minimizers of V (x; η) are all sta-
tionary Nash points, i.e., {x⋆ |V (x⋆; η) = 0} = SSNP for
all 0 < η ≤ 1
Lf
. If the individual functions fi are convex,
then the global minimizers of V (x; η) are precisely the set
SNE .
Proof. The nonnnegativity of V (x; η) follows from
Lemma 1. Further, V (x; η) = 0 if and only if∇ifi(x) = 0.
This proves the claim. The second claim follows by noting
that SNE = SSNP , if the functions fi are convex.
Theorem 1 shows that the function V (x; η) can be em-
ployed as a merit function for obtaining a stationary Nash
point. When fi(x) are non-convex, the convergence to first-
order point is possibly the best that one can hope for.
We provide the expressions for the gradient and Hessian of
Vi(x; η) next. These expressions follow from the chain rule
of differentiation. The gradient of Vi(x; η) is
∇Vi(x; η) =
∇fi(x)−
(
I − η∇2fi(x)Ei
)
∇fi(y(x; i, η))
(3)
where Ei = FiF
T
i with Fi ∈ R
n×ni defined as FTi =[
0ni×
∑i−1
j=1
nj
Ii 0ni×
∑
N
j=i+1
nj
]
, I ∈ Rn×n, and Ii ∈
R
ni×ni are identity matrices. The Hessian of Vi(x; η) is
given by
∇2Vi(x; η) = ∇
2fi(x) + η∇
3fi(x)[Ei∇fi(yi(x; i, η)]
− (I − η∇2fi(x)Ei)∇
2fi(y(x; i, η))(I − ηEi∇
2fi(x))
(4)
where ∇3fi(x)[d] = limα→0
∇2fi(x+αd)−∇
2fi(x)
α
is the
action of the third derivative along the direction d. These
expressions will come useful in our analysis to follow.
3.1. GNI is Locally Stable
GAN formulations typically result in objective func-
tions fi(x) that are not convex. Nagarajan and
Kolter (Nagarajan & Kolter, 2017) showed that the gra-
dient descent for min-max games is not stable for
Wasserstein GANs. This is due to the concave-
concave nature of Wasserstein GAN around stationary
Nash points (Nagarajan & Kolter, 2017). Daskalakis
et al. (Daskalakis et al., 2018) showed that the gra-
dient descent diverges for simple bilinear min-max
games, while the optimistic gradient decent algo-
rithm of Rakhlin and Sridharan (Rakhlin & Sridharan,
2013) was shown to be convergent. Daskalakis and
Pangeas (Daskalakis & Panageas, 2018) further analyzed
the limit points of gradient descent and optimistic gradient
descent using dynamical systems theory.
In this section, we show that at every stationary Nash point,
the Hessian of V (x; η) is positive semidefinite. This en-
sures that the points in SSNP are all stable limit points for
the gradient descent algorithm on V (x; η).
Lemma 2. For 0 ≤ η ≤ 1
Lf
, ∇V 2(x∗; η) =∑N
i=1∇
2Vi(x
⋆; η) is positive semidefinite for all x⋆ ∈
SSNP .
Proof. Let x⋆ ∈ SSNP . Since ∇ifi(x
⋆) = 0, we have
that y(x⋆; i, η) = x⋆ and∇3fi(x
⋆)[Ei∇fi(y(x; i, η))] =
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0. Substituting in the expression for ∇2Vi(x; η) in (4) and
simplifying, we obtain
∇2Vi(x
⋆; η) = 2η∇2fi(x
⋆)Ei∇
2fi(x
⋆)
− η2∇2fi(x
⋆)Ei∇
2fi(x
⋆)Ei∇
2fi(x
⋆)
= η∇2fi(x
⋆)(2Ei − ηEi∇
2fi(x
⋆)Ei)∇
2fi(x
⋆).
(5)
From the Lipschitz continuity of fi(x) we have that
∇2fi(x
⋆)  LfIn. Substituting into (5), we obtain
∇2Vi(x
⋆; η) η∇2fi(x
⋆)(2Ei − (ηLf )E
2
i )∇
2fi(x
⋆)
η∇2fi(x
⋆)Ei∇
2fi(x
⋆)
where the final simplification follows from ηLf ≤ 1 and
E2i = Ei. The claim follows from the positive semidefinite-
ness of ∇2fi(x
⋆)Ei∇
2fi(x
⋆). Since ∇2V (x∗; η) is the
sum of positive semidefinite matrices the claim holds.
3.2. Convexity Properties of GNI: An Example
In this section, we present an example NE reformulation of
a (non-) convex game using the GNI setup. Suppose the
player’s objective is quadratic, i.e., fi(x) =
1
2x
TQix +
rTi x. Then, the GNI function is
Vi(x) = fi(x)− fi(x− ηEi(Qix+ ri)) (6)
=
1
2
xT
(
Qi − Q̂
T
i QiQ̂i
)
x+ ηrTi EiQi(I + Q̂i)x
+
1
2
ηrTi (2Ei − ηEiQiEi)ri
where Q̂i = (I − ηEiQi). Suppose ‖Qi‖ ≤ Lf and let
η ≤ 1
Lf
, then
(Qi− Q̂
T
i QiQ̂i) = η(QiEi)(2I− ηQi)(EiQi)  0 (7)
where the positive semidefiniteness holds since for all
u 6= 0 uT (QiEi)(2I − ηQi)(EiQi)u = (QiEiu)
T (2I −
ηQi)(QiEiu) ≥ 0. Hence, when fi(x) is quadratic, the
GNI function is a convex, quadratic function. Note that
the convexity of GNI function holds regardless of the con-
vexity of the original function fi(x). However, for general
nonlinear functions fi(x), the GNI function Vi(x) does not
preserve convexity.
4. Descent Algorithm for GNI
Consider the gradient descent iteration minimizing V (x; η)
xk+1 = xk − ρ∇V (xk; η) for k = 0, 1, 2, . . . (8)
where ρ > 0 is a stepsize. The restrictions on ρ, if any, are
provided in subsequent discussions.
Theorem 2 proves sublinear convergence of {xk} to a sta-
tionary point of GNI function based on standard analysis.
Linear convergence to a stationary point point is shown
under the assumption of the Polyak-Łojasiewicz inequal-
ity (Łojasiewicz, 1963; Polyak, 1963; Karimi et al., 2018).
Luo & Tseng (1993) employed similar error bound condi-
tions in the context of descent algorithms of variational in-
equalities.
Theorem 2. Suppose ∇V (x) is LV -Lipschitz continuous.
Let ρ = α
LV
for 0 < α ≤ 1. Then, the {xk} generated
by (8) converges sublinearly to x⋆ a first-order stationary
point of V (x; η), i.e. ∇V (x⋆; η) = 0. If V (x; η) ≤
1
2µ‖∇V (x; η)‖
2 then the sequence {V (xk)} converges lin-
early to 0, i.e., {xk} converges to x⋆ ∈ SSNP .
Proof. From Lipschitz continuity of∇V (x; η)
V (xk+1; η) ≤V (xk; η) +∇V (xk; η)T (xk+1 − xk)
+
LV
2
‖xk+1 − xk‖2
≤V (xk, η)− ρ(1−
ρLV
2
)‖∇V (x; η)‖2
≤V (xk; η)−
α
2LV
‖∇V (x; η)‖2
(9)
where α = α(2−α). Telescoping the sum for k = 0, ...,K ,
we obtain
V (xK+1; η) ≤ V (x0)−
α
2LV
K∑
k=0
‖V (xK ; η)‖2. (10)
Since V (x; η) is bounded below by 0, we have that
α
2LV
K∑
k=0
‖∇V (xK ; η)‖2 ≤ V (x0)− V (xK+1) ≤ V (x0)
=⇒
α
2LV
min
k∈{0,...,K}
‖∇V (xk; η)‖2 ≤
V (x0)
K + 1
.
This proves the claim on sublinear convergence to a first-
order stationary point of V (x; η). Suppose V (x; η) ≤
1
2µ‖∇V (x; η)‖
2 holds. Substituting in (9) obtain
V (xk+1; η) ≤
(
1− α
µ
LV
)
V (xk; η) (11)
which proves the claim on linear convergence of
{V (xk; η)} to 0. By Theorem 1, {xk} converges to x⋆ ∈
SSNP .
4.1. Quadratic Objectives
In the following, we explore a popular setting of quadratic
objective function and explore the implication of Theorem
2. Note that the bilinear case is a special case of the
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quadratic objective. Consider the fi(x)’s to be quadratic.
For this setting §3.2 showed that GNI function Vi(x) is a
convex quadratic function. This proves that Vi(x; η) has
(3Lf )-Lipschitz continuous gradient. It is well known that
for a composition of a linear function with a strongly con-
vex function, we have that Polyak-Łojasiewicz inequality
holds (Luo & Tseng, 1993), i.e., there exists µ > 0 such
that V (x; η) ≤ 12µ‖∇V (x; η)‖
2 holds. Hence, we can
state the following stronger result for quadratic objective
functions.
Corollary 1. Suppose fi(x) are quadratic and player con-
vex, i.e. fi(x) is convex in xi. Let ρ =
1
3LfN
. Then, the
sequence {V (xk)} converges linearly to 0, i.e. {xk} con-
verges to x⋆ ∈ SNE .
5. Modified Descent Algorithm for GNI
The evaluation of the gradient ∇V (x; η) requires the com-
putation of the Hessian of the functions fi(x) (see (3))
which can be prohibitive to compute. A close examination
of the expression of ∇V (x; η) in (3) reveals that we only
require the action of the Hessian in a particular direction,
i.e. ∇fi(x− ηEi∇fi(x)). This immediately suggests the
use of an approximation for this term inspired by secant
methods (Nocedal & Wright, 2006)
∇2fi(x)(ηEi∇fi(x− ηEi∇fi(x)))
≈ ∇fi(x+ ηEi∇fi(x− ηEi∇fi(x))) −∇fi(x) (12)
Substituting (12) for the term involving the Hessian in
∇Vi(x; η) and simplifying obtain the direction∇V̂i(x; η):
∇V̂i(x; η) = ∇fi(x+ ηEi∇fi(x− ηEi∇fi(x)))
−∇fi(x− ηEi∇fi(x)) (13)
Substituting (12) in the gradient descent iteration (9), we
obtain the modified iteration
xk+1 = xk − ρ∇V̂i(x; η) for k = 0, 1, 2, . . . (14)
where ∇V̂i(x; η) =
N∑
i=1
∇V̂i(x; η). We assume that the
following bound on the error in the approximation
‖∇V̂ (x; η)−∇V (x; η)‖ ≤ τ‖∇V (x; η)‖, (15)
for some τ ∈ (0, 1). Such a bound on the error in the
gradients has also been used in Luo & Tseng (1993).
Theorem 3. Suppose ∇V (x) is LV -Lipschitz continuous.
Let ρ = α 1−τ
LV (1+τ)2
for 0 < α ≤ 1 and (15) holds. Then,
the {xk} generated by (14) converges sublinearly to x⋆ a
first-order stationary point of V (x; η), i.e.,∇V (x⋆; η) = 0.
If V (x; η) ≤ 12µ‖∇V (x; η)‖
2, then the sequence {V (xk)}
converges linearly to 0, i.e., {xk} converges to x⋆ ∈
SSNP .
Proof. Let ∇V̂ (xk; η) = ∇V (xk; η) + ek. From (15),
‖ek‖ ≤ τ‖∇V (xk; η)‖. Applying the triangle inequality
to ‖∇V̂ (xk; η)‖ and use (15) obtain
‖∇V̂ (xk)‖ ≤ ‖∇V (xk; η) + ‖ek‖
≤ (1 + τ)‖∇V (xk; η)‖.
(16)
The term −(∇V (xk; η))T (∇V̂ (xk; η)) can be upper
bounded as
− (∇V (xk; η))T (∇V̂ (xk; η))
=− ‖∇V (xk; η)‖2 − (∇V (xk; η))T ek
≤− ‖∇V (xk; η)‖2 + ‖∇V (xk; η)‖‖ek‖
≤ − (1− τ)‖∇V (xk; η)‖2
(17)
where the final inequality follows from (15). From Lips-
chitz continuity of∇V (x; η)
V (xk+1; η)
≤V (xk; η) +∇V (xk; η)T (xk+1 − xk)
+
LV
2
‖xk+1 − xk‖2
≤V (xk, η)− ρ(∇V (xk; η))T (∇V̂ (xk; η))+
LV ρ
2
2
‖∇V̂ (x; η)‖2
≤V (xk, η)− ρ(1 − τ)‖∇V (xk; η)‖2+
LV ρ
2
2
(1 + τ)2‖∇V (x; η)‖2
≤V (xk; η)− ρ
(
1− τ −
LV ρ(1 + τ)
2
2
)
‖∇V (x; η)‖2
≤V (xk; η)−
α
2
(1− τ)2
LV (1 + τ)2
‖∇V (x; η)‖2
(18)
where α = α(2 − α), the third inequality is obtained by
substituting (16) and (17), and the final inequality follows
from the definition of ρ in the statement of the theorem. By
similar arguments to those in Theorem 2 obtain
α
(1− τ)2
2LV (1 + τ)2
min
k∈{0,...,K}
‖∇V (xk; η)‖2 ≤
V (x0)
K + 1
.
This proves the claim on sublinear convergence to a first-
order stationary point of V (x; η). Suppose V (x; η) ≤
1
2µ‖∇V (x; η)‖
2 holds. Substituting in (18) obtain
V (xk+1; η) ≤
(
1− α
µ(1− τ)2
LV (1 + τ)2
)
V (xk; η) (19)
which proves the claim on linear convergence of
{V (xk; η)} to 0. By Theorem 1, {xk} converges to x⋆ ∈
SSNP .
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The approximation in (12) is in fact exact when the function
fi(x) is quadratic. Consequently, the claims on the conver-
gence of the iterates continue to hold when the iterates are
generated by (14).
6. Experiments
In this section, we present several empirical results on sim-
ulated data demonstrating the effectiveness of the proposed
GNI formulation. To demonstrate the correctness of our
theoretical results, we show numerical results on several
simple game settings with known equilibrium. Specifi-
cally, we consider the following payoff functions: i) bi-
linear two-player games, ii) quadratic games with convex
and non-convex payoffs, iii) linear GAN using a Dirac
delta generator, and iv) a more general linear GAN with
linear generator and discriminator. We compare our de-
scent algorithm against several popular choices such as
(i) gradient descent, (ii) gradient descent with Adam-style
updates (Kingma & Ba, 2014), (iii) optimistic mirror de-
scent (Rakhlin & Sridharan, 2013; Daskalakis et al., 2018),
(iv) the extrapolation scheme (Gidel et al., 2018), and (v)
the extra-gradient method (Korpelevich, 1976). For all
these methods, we either follow the standard hyperparame-
ter settings (e.g., in Adam), or we find the hyperparameters
that lead to the best convergence. For each of these games,
we observe convergence of the proposed algorithm to sta-
tionary Nash points and contrast the quality of solutions
against what can be theoretically guaranteed. As discussed
in Section 3.2, the quadratic and bilinear cases lead to con-
vex GNI function and thus, the game always converges to
a NE. Refer to supplementary materials for extra experi-
ments. Below, we detail each of the game settings.
6.1. Bi-Linear Two-player Game:
We consider the following two-player game:
f1(x) = x
T
1 Qx2 + q
T
1 x1 + q
T
2 x2 = −f2(x), (20)
where f1 and f2 are the player’s payoff functions – a setting
explored in (Gidel et al., 2018). The GNI for this game
leads to a convex objective. For GNI, we use a step-size
η = 1/L, where L = ‖Q‖, and ρ = 0.01, while for other
methods we use a stepsize of η = 0.0011. The methods
are initialized randomly – the initialization is seen to have
little impact on the convergence of GNI, however changed
drastically for that of others.
In Figure 1(a), we plot the gradient convergence (using 10-
d data). In this plot (and all subsequent plots of gradi-
ent convergence), the norm of the gradient ‖∇f(xk)‖ =
‖(∇1f1(x
k), . . . ,∇NfN (x
k))‖. We see that GNI con-
verges linearly. However, other methods, such as gradient
1Other values of η did not seem to result in stable descent.
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Figure 1. (a) shows GNI against other methods for bilinear min-
max game. (b) shows convergence trajectories for 1-dimensional
players. For (b), the initial point is shown in red diamond.
descent and mirror descent iterates diverge, while the extra-
gradient and Adam are seen to converge slowly. To under-
stand the descent better, in Figure 1(b), we use x1, x2 ∈ R
1,
and plot them for every 100-th iteration starting from the
same initial point (shown by the red-diamond). Interest-
ingly, we find that the extragradient and mirror-descent
methods show a circular trajectory, while Adam (with β1 =
0.9 and β2 = 0.999) takes a spiral convergence path. GNI
takes a more straight trajectory steadily decreasing to op-
tima (shown by the blue straight line).
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Figure 2. Convergence of GNI against other methods for
Quadratic games. (a) Non-convex QP with indefinite Q matrices
for each player, (b) convex QP with semi-definite Q matrices.
6.2. Two-Player Quadratic Games:
We consider two-player games (multiplayer extensions are
trivial) with the payoff functions:
fi(x) =
1
2
xTQix+ r
T
i x, for i = 1, 2 (21)
where Qi ∈ R
n×n is symmetric. We consider cases when
each Qi is indefinite (i.e., non-convex QP) and positive
semi-definite. As with the bilinear case, all the QP payoffs
result in convex GNI reformulations. We used 20-d data,
the same stepsizes η = maxi(‖Qi‖) and ρ = 0.01 for GNI,
while using η = 10−4 for other methods. The players are
initialized fromN(0, I).
In Figure 2, we compare the descent on these quadratic
games. We find that the competitivemethods are difficult to
GNI Formulation for Games
optimize for the non-convex QP and almost all of them di-
verge, except Adam which converges slowly. GNI is found
to converge to the stationary Nash point (as it is convex–
in §3.2). For the convex case, all methods are found to
converge. To gain insight, we plot the convergence trajec-
tory for a 1-d convex quadratic game (i.e., x1, x2 ∈ R
1)
in Figure 3. The initializations are random for both play-
ers and the parameters are equal. We see that all schemes
follow similar trajectories, except for Adam and GNI – all
converging to the same point.
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Figure 3. Convergence of GNI against other methods on a convex
1−d quadratic game. Left: the convergence achieved by different
algorithms. Right: the trajectories of the two players to the NE.
6.3. Dirac Delta GAN
This is a one-dimensional GAN explored in (Gidel et al.,
2018). In this case, the real data is assumed to follow a
Dirac delta distribution (with a spike at say point -2). The
payoff functions for the two players are:
f1 = log(1 + exp(θx1)) + log(1 + exp(x1x2))
f2 =− log(1 + exp(x1x2)), (22)
where θ ∈ R1 is the location of the delta spike. Unlike
other game settings described above, we do not have an an-
alytical formula to find the Lipscitz constant for the payoffs.
To this end, we did an empirical estimate (more details to
follow). We used L = 2, η = ρ = 1/L and initialized all
players uniformly from [0, 4].
Figure 4 shows the comparison of the convergence of the
dirac delta GAN game to a stationary Nash point. The GNI
achieves faster convergence than all other methods, albeit
having a non-convex reformulation in contrast to the bilin-
ear and QP cases discussed above. The game has multi-
ple local solutions and the schemes may converge to varied
points depending on their initialization (see supplementary
material for details).
6.4. Linear GAN
We now introduce a more general GAN setup – a variant of
the non-saturating GAN described in (Goodfellow, 2016),
however using a linear generator and discriminator. We de-
signed this experiment to serve two key goals: (i) to exposit
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Figure 4. Convergence of GNI against other methods on the Dirac-
Delta GAN.
the influence of the GNI hyperparameters in a more gen-
eral GAN setting, and (ii) show the performance of GNI
on a setting for which it is harder to estimate a Lipschitz
constant L. While, our proposed setting is not a neural net-
work, it allows to understand the behavior of GNI when
other non-linearities arising from the layers of a neural net-
work are absent, and thereby study GNI in isolation.
Experimental Setup: The payoff functions are:
f1 =−Eθ∼Prlog
(
xT1 θ
)
−Ez∼Pz log
(
1− xT1 diag (x2) z
)
,
f2 =−Ez∼Pz log
(
xT2 diag (x1) z
)
, (23)
where Pr and Pz are the real and the noise data distri-
butions, the latter being the standard normal distribution
N(0, I). The operator diag returns a diagonal matrix with
its argument as its diagonal. We consider two cases for Pr:
(i) Pr = N(µ, I) for a mean µ and (ii) Pr = N(µ,Σ) for a
covariance matrix Σ ∈ Rd×d. In our experiments to follow,
we use µ = 2e, e being a d-dimensional vector (d = 10) of
all ones. We initialized x1 = x2 = e/d for all the methods.
EvaluationMetrics: To evaluate the performance on var-
ious hyper-parameters of GNI, we define two metrics: (i)
discriminator-accuracy, and (ii) the distance-to-mean. The
discriminator-accuracy measures how well the learned dis-
criminator classifies the two distributions, defined as:
dacc=
1
2M
M∑
i=1
I(xT1 θi ≥ ζ)+I
(
xT1 diag(x
i
2)zi ≤ (1− ζ)
)
,
where I is the indicator function, M is the number of
data points sampled from the respective distributions, and
ζ ∈ [0, 1] is a threshold for the indicator function. We use
ζ = 0.7. While dacc measures the quality of the discrim-
inator learned, it does not tell us anything on the conver-
gence of the generator. To this end, we present anothermea-
sure to evaluate the generator; specifically, the distance-to-
mean, that computes the distance of the generated distribu-
tion from the first moment of the true distribution, defined
as:
dmean = ‖Ez∼Pzdiag(x2)z − Eθ∼Prθ‖ (24)
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Figure 5. Study of the influence of the step sizes (ρ and η) on the convergence of GNI reformulations for the linear GAN game.
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(a) Generator, Pr = N(µ, I)
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(c) Generator, Pr = N(µ,Σ)
Figure 6. Convergence of GNI against other methods on the linear GAN two-player game. The real-data distribution is sampled from
N(µ, I) for (a) and (b), while we use N(µ,Σ) for (c), where Σ = diag(ξ), ξ ∼ U(0, 1]. Note that, when the optimization converges,
the discriminator is expected to be confused between the real and fake data distributions (i.e., classification accuracy is 0.5).
Hyper-parameter Study: The goal of this experiment is
to analyze the descent trajectory of GNI-based gradient de-
scent when the hyper-parameters are changed. To this end,
we vary η and ρ separately in the range 10−5 to 10 in mul-
tiples of 10, while keeping the other parameter fixed (we
use η = 0.1 and ρ = 1 as the base settings). In Fig-
ure 5, we plot the discriminator-accuracy and distance-to-
mean against GNI iterations for the generator and discrimi-
nator separately. From Figures 5(a) and (b), it appears that
higher value of η biases the descents on the generator and
discriminator separately. For example, η ≥ 0.01 leads to
a sharp descent to the optimal solution of the discrimina-
tor, however, η > 1 leads to a generator breakdown (Fig-
ure 5(a)). Similarly, a small value of ρ, such as ρ < 10−5
shows high distance-to-mean, i.e., generator is weak, while,
ρ = 1 leads to good descents for both the generator and the
discriminator. We found that a higher ρ leads to unstable
descent, skewing the plots and thus not shown. In short,
we found that making the discriminator quickly converge
to its optimum could lead to a better convergence trajectory
for the generator for this linear GAN setup using the GNI
scheme.
Comparisons to Other Algorithms: In Figures 6(a)
and (b), we plot the distance-to-mean and discriminator-
accuracy of linear GAN using η = 0.1 and ρ = 1, and com-
pare it to all other descent schemes. Interestingly, we found
that Adam shows a different pattern of convergence, with
the distance-to-mean steadily decreasing to zero; on close
inspection (Figure 6(b)), we see that the discriminator-
accuracy simultaneously goes to zero as well, suggesting
the non-optimality of the descent. In contrast, our GNI
converges quickly. In Figure 6(c), we plot the convergence
when using a real data distribution Pr = N(µ,Σ), where
µ ∼ U(0, 1)d; a d-dimensional uniform distribution and Σ
is a randomly-sampled diagonal covariancematrix. The de-
scent in this general setting also looks similar to the one in
Figure 6(a).
7. Conclusions
We presented a novel formulation for Nash equilibrium
computation in multi-player games by introducing the
Gradient-based Nikaido-Isoda (GNI) function. The GNI
formulation for games allows individual players to locally
improve their objectives using steepest descent while pre-
serving local stability and convergence guarantees. We
showed that the GNI function is a valid merit function for
multi-player games and presented an approximate descent
algorithm. We compared our method against several popu-
lar descent schemes on multiple game settings and empir-
ically demonstrated that our method outperforms all other
GNI Formulation for Games
techniques. Future research will explore the GNI method
in stochastic settings, that may enable their applicability to
GAN optimization.
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A. Residual Minimization
Lemma 1 (in the main paper) also suggests another
possible function for minimization, namely Φ(x) =
1
2
2∑
i=1
‖∇ifi(x)‖
2. We can state a result that is analogous
to Theorem 1.
Theorem 4. The global minimizers of Φ(x) are all first-
order NE points, i.e., {x⋆ |Φ(x⋆) = 0} = SSNP . If the
individual functions fi are convex then the global minimiz-
ers of Φ(x) are precisely the set SNE .
Denote by F (x) =
[
∇1f1(x)
∇2f2(x)
]
the vector function of the
first-order stationary conditions for each of the players. So
Φ(x) = 12‖F (x)‖
2. The gradient of Φ(x) is given by
∇Φ(x) = ∇F (x)F (x)
=
[
∇211f1(x) ∇
2
12f2(x)
∇221f1(x) ∇
2
22f2(x)
] [
∇1f1(x)
∇2f2(x)
]
.
(25)
The Hessian of the function Φ(x) is
∇2Φ(x) =
 n∑
j=1
Fj(x)∇
2Fj(x) +∇F (x)∇F (x)
T
 .
(26)
Consider the gradient descent iteration for minimizing
Φ(x) with stepsize ρ > 0
xk+1 = xk − ρ∇Φ(xk). (27)
We can state the following convergence result for the gradi-
ent descent iterations.
Theorem 5. Suppose ∇Φ(x) is LΦ-Lipschitz continuous.
Let ρ = 1
LΦ
. Then, the {xk} generated by (27) con-
verges sublinearly to x⋆ a first-order critical point of Φ(x),
∇Φ(x⋆) = 0. If Φ(x) ≤ 12µ‖∇Φ(x)‖
2 then the sequence
{xk} converges linearly to a x⋆ ∈ SSNP .
Proof. From Lipschitz continuity of∇Φ(x)
Φ(xk+1) ≤Φ(xk) +∇Φ(xk)T (xk+1 − xk)
+
LΦ
2
‖xk+1 − xk‖2
≤Φ(xk, )− ρ(1−
ρLΦ
2
)‖∇Φ(x)‖2
≤Φ(xk)−
1
2LΦ
‖∇Φ(x)‖2.
(28)
Telescoping the sum and k = 0, ...,K obtain
Φ(xK+1) ≤ Φ(x0)−
1
2LΦ
K∑
k=0
‖Φ(xK)‖2. (29)
Since Φ(x) is bounded below by 0 we have that
1
2LΦ
K∑
k=0
‖∇Φ(xK)‖2 ≤ Φ(x0)− Φ(xK+1) ≤ Φ(x0)
=⇒
1
2LΦ
min
k∈{0,...,K}
‖∇Φ(xk)‖2 ≤
Φ(x0)
K + 1
.
GNI Formulation for Games
This proves the claim on sublinear convergence to a
first-order stationary point of Φ(x). Suppose Φ(x) ≤
1
2µ‖∇Φ(x)‖
2 holds. Substituting in (28) obtain
Φ(xk+1) ≤
(
1−
µ
LΦ
)
Φ(x) (30)
which proves the claim on linear convergence.
In the following we provide specific conditions under
which the bound Φ(x) ≤ 12µ‖∇Φ(x)‖
2 holds.
• Suppose the function fi are quadratic then the discus-
sion following Theorem 3 applies.
• Suppose the function F (x) is strongly monotone,
(F (x) − F (xˆ))T (x − xˆ) ≥ β‖x − xˆ‖2. This implies
that the fi(x) are β-strongly convex. Then, it follows
that∇F (x)  βIn for all x ∈ R
n. This also provides
the following bound
‖∇Φ(x; η)‖2 ≥ (β)2‖F (x)‖2 = 2β2Φ(x). (31)
Hence, µ = β2.
B. Additional Experiments
In this Section, we present more empirical results for the
four different games that were discussed in the main pa-
per which help understand the convergence behavior of the
proposed method. More concretely, the results validate the
results for convergence rate and the quality of solutions for
the different games discussed in the main paper.
B.1. Convergence Rate for Bilinear and Quadratic
Games:
We provide plots that suggest linear convergence rate for
bilinear and strongly-convex quadratic games as was de-
scribed in the main paper. For both cases we use 20-d
variables for both players which are initialized arbitrarily.
From the plots shown in Figure 7, we observe that V func-
tion decays linearly to close to zero and then it slows down
as the gradient of V starts to vanish (suggested by Theo-
rem 2 in the main paper). It is noted that the guarantees for
linear convergence are for the V function (and not for∇f )
and thus we skip plots for∇f .
B.2. Two-Player Quadratic Games:
We describe an experiment for non-convex two-player
quadratic games with indefinite Q matrices for both play-
ers. We show the decay of the gradient and the V func-
tion for the GNI formulation. The other optimization algo-
rithms are seen to be diverging for the indefinite cases (as
was shown in the main text) and thus are not shown here.
0 100 200 300 400 500
Iterations
10 -2
10 -1
10 0
10 1
10 2
V(
x)
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
Iterations
10 -3
10 -2
10 -1
10 0
10 1
10 2
V(
x)
Figure 7. Convergence rate for bilinear and convex quadratic
games using the GNI method. Left: Decay of V function for
Bilinear Game. Right: Decay of V function for Strongly-convex
Quadratic Game.
We used 50−d data, the same stepsizes η = maxi(‖Qi‖)
and ρ = 0.01 for GNI. The methods are initialized ran-
domly fromN(0, I). For clarification, we show the plot on
log scale. As can be observed from the plots in Figure 8,
∇f goes to zero as V goes to zero.
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Figure 8. Convergence of GNI method for non-convex quadratic
game setting shown on a semi-log plot for clarity. Left: Decay of
V function. Right: Decay of the∇f .
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Figure 9. Convergence of GNI against other methods on the Dirac-
Delta GAN. Left: Convergence of different methods seen by the
decay of∇f . Right: Trajectory of the two players to the optima.
B.3. Linear GAN:
We also show some additional results for the Linear GAN
which suggests convergence of the proposed method to a
NE. The second derivative of the objective function for
both the players is positive semidefinite (see Equation (23)
in the main paper) indicating all stationary points are min-
imas. In the following plots in Figure 11, we show the
convergence of the V function and the ||∇f || for the GNI
GNI Formulation for Games
Algorithm GNI Adam ExGrad Grad OMD ExPol
Mean Error 2.11 0.64 2.17 2.18 1.87 1.87
Mean number of Iterations 77 3048 10000 10000 10000 10000
Figure 10. Error Statistics for GNI compared against other techniques for the Dirac Delta GAN
formulation. We observe very fast convergence for both
the V and the ||∇f || indicating convergence to a SNP. Ad-
ditionally, since all SNPs are NEs in this particular setting,
the GNI converges to a NE.
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Figure 11. Convergence of V function and ||∇f || for the Linear
GAN discussed in the main paper. Left: Decay of V function.
Right: Decay of the∇f .
B.4. Dirac Delta GAN:
In this section, we show another experiment for the Dirac
Delta GAN that was discussed in the main text. All the pa-
rameters for all optimizers are kept constant as in the main
text for Dirac Delta GAN. In Figure 9, we see the conver-
gence of∇f as well as the trajectories followed by the two
players to the NE. All the methods converge to the same
optima- however, the GNI converges faster than any other
method. As observed in the convex quadratic case, we see
all descent methods following the same trajectory except
for the GNI and Adam. However, it was observed that the
GNI and the other algorithms do not converge to the same
solution when initialized arbitrarily. To investigate this, we
perform an experiment where the game was initialized ran-
domly from 1000 initial conditions in a square region in
[−4, 4]× [−4, 4]. The error from the ground truth was com-
puted after 10000 iterations or up on convergence (the min-
imum of two). Results of the experiment are shown as a
table in Figure 10. It is observed that the game doesn’t con-
verge to the known ground truth for the game– Adam is
able to get closest to the ground truth while GNI converges
to a stationary Nash point much faster than all other algo-
rithms. This behavior could be explained by recalling that
GNI is using V function to descend and thus, converges to
the closest stationary Nash point where V vanishes.
